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URBANITES VERSUS RURAL RIGHTS: 
CONTEST OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND-USE 
REGULATIONS UNDER WASHINGTON PREEMPTION 
STATUTE 82.02.020 
Donya Williamson 
Abstract: In Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights v. Sims,1 the Court of Appeals of 
Washington held that King County clearing and grading regulations—recently enacted 
pursuant to the Washington State Growth Management Act—constitute an unlawful “tax, 
fee, or charge” on the development of land, thereby violating a Washington excise tax 
preemption statute. The court ruled that the clearing limitations do not qualify under the 
statutory exception for mitigation of development impacts since they are not calculated on a 
site-by-site basis. This Note argues that the ruling greatly expands the scope of this statutory 
limitation on local land-use regulation, compromises Growth Management Act policies, and 
misconstrues prior case law. If upheld, the decision’s approach will significantly constrain 
municipal authority to protect environmental quality through land-use regulations. 
INTRODUCTION 
Development restrictions implemented pursuant to the Washington 
State Growth Management Act (GMA) have caused tension between 
landowners, developers, and government2 since the state legislature 
enacted the GMA in 1990.3 In King County, Washington, the conflict 
                                                     
1. 145 Wash. App. 649, 187 P.3d 786 (2008), cert. denied, 165 Wash. 2d 1030, 203 P.3d 378 
(2009).  
2. See generally, Quadrant Corp. v. State Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 154 Wash. 2d 224, 110 
P.3d 1132 (2005) (citizens’ group contested county’s designation of GMA-mandated urban growth 
area); Ass’n of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 141 Wash. 2d 185, 4 P.3d 115 (2000) (citizens’ 
group contested county issuance of development permit for project outside of GMA-mandated 
urban growth area); Snohomish County v. Anderson, 124 Wash. 2d 834, 881 P.2d 240 (1994) 
(citizens’ group sought to subject county’s GMA-mandated planning policy to referendum); 
Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. 649, 187 P.3d 786 (citizens’ group contested county’s critical 
areas ordinance, enacted pursuant to the GMA); Honesty in Envtl. Analysis and Legislation (HEAL) 
v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 96 Wash. App. 522, 979 P.2d 864 (1999) 
(interest group challenged city’s adoption of critical areas ordinance, enacted pursuant to the GMA). 
3. Growth Management Act, ch. 17, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1972 (codified as 
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2008)); Growth Management Act—Revised Provisions, 
ch. 32, 1991 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 2903 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 
36.70A (2008)). The 1990 and 1991 legislatures enacted the GMA in two installments known as 
“GMA I” and “GMA II.” Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management 
Revolution in Washington: Past, Present, and Future, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 867, 871–72 
(1993). 
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also divides urban and rural interests. Approximately 1.9 million people 
live in King County;4 and while nearly one-third of that population lives 
in Seattle,5 over 1500 of the county’s 2000 square miles are zoned for 
rural, forest, and agricultural uses.6 Nearly 150,000 people live in these 
unincorporated rural areas.7 
In 2004, the King County Council considered a controversial clearing 
and grading ordinance that would prohibit rural landowners from 
clearing some types of vegetation—generally, trees and brush—from 
fifty or sixty-five percent of their land.8 
Advocates argued that the limits were necessary to prevent further 
erosion and flooding, and to keep chemicals from running into rivers and 
streams.9 Rural residents, who took the position that the proposed 
clearing and grading restrictions would unfairly limit what they could do 
with their land, fought the ordinance throughout the public-comment 
process,10 including at the October 25, 2004 King County Council 
                                                     
4. KING COUNTY OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 2008 ANNUAL GROWTH REPORT 55 (2008) 
[hereinafter ANNUAL GROWTH 2008], available at http://www.metrokc.gov/budget/agr/agr08/ 
#cities. In Annual Growth 2008, the county reports 1,884,200 people resided in King County. Id. In 
2004, when the county enacted its clearing and grading ordinance, 1,788,300 people resided in King 
County. KING COUNTY OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 2004 ANNUAL GROWTH REPORT 55 (2004) 
[hereinafter ANNUAL GROWTH 2004], available at http://www.metrokc.gov/budget/agr/agr04/ 
#cities. 
5. ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, at 55. In ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, the county reports an 
estimated 592,800 people resided in the City of Seattle. Id. In 2004, an estimated 572,600 people 
resided in the City of Seattle. ANNUAL GROWTH 2004, supra note 4, at 55. 
6. ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, inside front cover, 117 (noting rural unincorporated 
King County has a land area of 1676 square miles). 
7. ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, at 117. Rural unincorporated King County has a 
population of about 144,000. Id. In 2004, rural unincorporated King County had a population of 
about 137,000. ANNUAL GROWTH 2004, supra note 4, at 117. 
8. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14 (2004), available at http://www.metrokc.gov/ 
mkcc/cao/clearing_grading_15053.pdf (codified at KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE tit. 16.82.150, 
.152 (2008), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation/kc_code.aspx); Keith 
Ervin, Court Says Rural-Land Restrictions Go Too Far, SEATTLE TIMES, Jul. 8, 2008, at A1 
[hereinafter Ervin, Restrictions Go Too Far]; see Keith Ervin, Panel Approves Land-Use Package, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 29, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter Ervin, Panel Approves]. 
9. Natalie Singer, Suit Challenges Land-Use Rules, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at B5. 
10. Keith Ervin, County Approves Pair of Land-Use Regulations, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, 
at B1 [hereinafter Ervin, County Approves]; Keith Ervin, Foes Vow Court Fight Over Land-Use 
Rules, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter Ervin, Court Fight]; Ervin, Panel 
Approves, supra note 8, at B1; Laura Onstot, Can’t Keep Them Down on the Farm, SEATTLE 
WEEKLY, Sept. 3, 2008, at 16. 
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meeting at which the members cast their votes.11 The ordinance passed 
by a 7–6 vote divided along partisan lines, with Democrats, who largely 
represented urban areas,12 voting in favor of its enactment.13 
Although the county had revised the ordinance based on public 
feedback, the ordinance as enacted was not a satisfactory compromise 
for the rural opposition. Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights, a 
political action committee comprising property owners potentially 
impacted by the county’s proposed clearing and grading restrictions, 
sued King County. It argued that the ordinance ran afoul of the state 
constitution and amounted to a tax prohibited by state law.14 
The Washington State Court of Appeals held that the clearing and 
grading ordinance was an unlawful “tax, fee, or charge” because it did 
not require individually determined clearing and grading restrictions 
based on site-specific evaluations of each plot of land.15 The court did 
not reach the constitutional issues.16 The decision could seriously 
undermine the ability of local governments to plan for responsible land 
use. If counties have to conduct site-specific evaluations, it will be more 
costly and time-consuming to create the comprehensive land-use plans 
the GMA requires. 
This Note argues that the court of appeals erred in calling the land-use 
regulations an unlawful “tax, fee, or charge.” Part I gives an overview of 
the GMA. Part II introduces constitutional and statutory protections 
available to Washington landowners and developers, and Part III 
describes key cases interpreting some of these protections. Part IV 
introduces the King County ordinance, reviews the environmental 
concerns that spurred the ordinance, and discusses the rural response to 
the clearing restrictions. Part V describes Citizens’ Alliance for Property 
Rights v. Sims, 17 which Part VI argues was decided in error. 
                                                     
11. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B1. 
12. Id. at B7. 
13. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053. 
14. Citizens’ Alliance for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash. App. 649, 654, 187 P.3d 786, 789 
(2008); First Amended Complaint for Violation of RCW 82.02, Substantive Due Process (Wash. 
Const. art. I § 3), and Declaratory Relief at 5–7, Citizens’ Alliance, No. 04-2-13831-9 (Wash. Super. 
Ct. Snohomish County, filed Mar. 3, 2005); Onstot, supra note 10, at 18. 
15. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 665, 187 P.3d at 794. 
16. Id. at 653, 187 P.3d at 788. 
17. 145 Wash. App. 649, 187 P.3d 786 (2008), cert. denied, 165 Wash. 2d 1030, 203 P.3d 378 
(2009). Ronald Sims served as King County Executive from 1996 to 2009. Keith Ervin, King 
County Exec Race Centers on Budget Skills, SEATTLE TIMES, June 14, 2009, at B1. 
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I. THE GMA EMPOWERS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO 
DEVELOP COMPREHENSIVE LAND-USE PLANS 
The Washington landscape includes forestland, pastures, wetlands 
and deserts, and the state’s people live in vast ranching areas and farm 
communities as well as densely populated cities and suburbs.18 
Washington’s natural resources, from salmon to lumber to minerals, 
were the cornerstone of its economy throughout its early years.19 During 
the 1970s and 1980s a massive influx of new residents20 strained the 
state’s environment and landscape.21 By the late 1980s, it had become 
clear that Washington needed new approaches to manage population 
growth and development.22 
In 1990, the Washington State Legislature passed the Growth 
Management Act,23 which channels growth into urban centers and aims 
to reduce sprawl and preserve the character of rural areas.24 The 
responsibility for implementing and enforcing the GMA’s mandates falls 
chiefly to local governments,25 allowing land-use planning under the 
GMA to account for local problems and needs. This can result in tension 
in counties with large urban populations and urban-centered local 
                                                     
18. Onstot, supra note 10, at 17. 
19. Id. 
20. WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, POPULATION CHANGE BY 
DECADE: EAST AND WEST (2001), http://www.ofm.wa.gov/census2000/pl/charts/chart02.asp 
[hereinafter POPULATION CHANGE]; see Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880–81; Ed Penhale, 
Managing State Growth Looms as Hot Issue for ‘90 Legislature, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 
Jan. 1, 1990, at A1. 
21. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880–81; Penhale, supra note 20, at A1; see also, 
POPULATION CHANGE, supra note 20. 
22. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880–81; Penhale, supra note 20, at A1; Joseph W. Tovar, 
Needed: A Central Vision—A New Strategy for Growth, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 3, 1989, at A20 
(discussing a report of conclusions and recommendations by members of the Washington City 
Planning Directors Association and the Washington State Association of County Regional Planning 
Directors with respect to a new strategy for growth management in Washington). 
23. Growth Management Act, ch. 17, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1972, (codified as 
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2008)); see also Growth Management Act—Revised 
Provisions, ch. 32, 1991 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 2903 (codified as amended at WASH. 
REV. CODE § 36.70A (2008)). 
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020 (2008) (listing the Act’s planning goals, including 
“[e]ncourag[ing] . . . development in urban areas where adequate public facilities and services exist 
or can be provided in an efficient manner” and “[r]educ[ing] the inappropriate conversion of 
undeveloped land into sprawling, low-density development.”). 
25. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040(1) (2008). In this Note, “local government” refers to the 
governing bodies of towns, cities, or counties. 
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government because rural landowners sometimes feel their voices are 
overwhelmed by urbanites who do not understand rural lifestyles, 
underestimate ruralites’ environmental awareness, and assign a 
disproportionate share of environmental protection costs to the rural 
minority.26 
A. Local Governments Must Enact Land-Use Regulations 
Consistent with the GMA’s Goals and According to Defined 
Procedures 
By the late 1980s Washington’s economy was booming, but the 
steadily increasing population and urban sprawl created traffic 
congestion,27 reduced areas of open space,28 and intensified instances of 
environmental degradation.29 The state was in dire need of a 
comprehensive strategy to manage growth.30 The land-use and 
development policies in effect were scattered throughout statutes enacted 
over the course of a century: a constitution written in the late 1880s,31 
planning laws adopted in the 1930s,32 and environmental acts passed in 
the 1970s and 1980s.33 State agencies were sending uncoordinated and 
conflicting messages to local governments, private developers, and the 
public,34 and local governments were working under one of the weakest 
mandates for comprehensive planning in the United States.35 
In 1990, the state legislature passed the GMA,36 which empowers 
                                                     
26. See Onstot, supra note 10, at 17. 
27. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880; Penhale, supra note 20, at A4. 
28. Penhale, supra note 20, at A1; see Tovar, supra note 22, at A20. 
29. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880. The state population grew by about 734,000 people in 
the 1980s, with more than ninety percent of that growth concentrated in western Washington. 
POPULATION CHANGE, supra note 20; see Onstot, supra note 10, at 17; Penhale, supra note 20, at 
A1; Tovar, supra note 22, at A20. 
30. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 870–72, 880–81; Penhale, supra note 20, at A1, 4; 
Tovar, supra note 22, at A20. 
31. Tovar, supra note 22, at A20. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. (“Prime examples [of conflicting planning strategies] are the Transportation 1990 Plan, the 
Environment 2010 Report and the Washington Works Worldwide economic development 
strategy. . . . Each effort proceeded with independent direction . . . . ”). 
34. Id.; see Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 875–80. 
35. Tovar, supra note 22, at A20. 
36. Growth Management Act, ch. 17, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1972, (codified as 
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2008)); see also, Growth Management Act—Revised 
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local governments to create land-use plans, called “comprehensive 
plans,” consistent with economic development and environmental 
protection.37 The GMA lists thirteen planning goals, including protecting 
the environment, focusing growth in high-density urban areas, protecting 
landowners from arbitrary and capricious regulations, and promoting 
development “within the capacities of the state’s natural resources.”38 
Local governments bear primary responsibility for implementing the 
GMA’s mandate,39 but the GMA does not tell them how to balance what 
critics have described as contradictory goals.40 
Under the GMA, all of the state’s local governments must designate 
“critical areas” and enact regulations to protect them.41 Critical areas 
include wetlands, areas essential for potable water, and fish and wildlife 
conservation areas.42 The GMA requires local governments to use the 
“best available science” to identify critical areas and to craft the 
restrictions that apply to them.43 Scientific inquiry is particularly 
relevant to the designation and regulation of critical areas, although local 
governments may balance scientific findings against the GMA’s other 
goals.44 
                                                     
Provisions, ch. 32, 1991 Wash. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 2903 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. 
CODE § 36.70A (2008)). 
37. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.010, .020, .040 (2008); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-
195 (2009) (“Growth Management Act—Procedural Criteria for Adopting Comprehensive Plans 
and Development Regulations”). 
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(1)–(13). 
39. Id. § 36.70A.040. 
40. 24 TIM BUTLER & MATTHEW KING, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 18.2, at 231 (2d ed. 2008) (“[A] cursory review of these goals reveals they are vague 
and contradictory.” (citing Carol M. Ostrom, Land-Use Planning—Or Just Land Grab? Chelan 
County Fight Could Affect Whole State, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at A1)). 
41. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.060(2)–(3), .170 (“Each county and city shall adopt 
development regulations that protect critical areas that are required to be designated under RCW 
36.70A.170.”); see also WASH ADMIN. CODE §§ 365-190-040, -080 (2009). 
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.030(5). 
43. Id. § 36.70A.172(1). This requirement was added to the GMA in 1995. Growth Management 
Act, ch. 347 § 105, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1556, 1560. The mandatory procedure for 
application of the best available science is set forth in the Washington Administrative Code. WASH. 
ADMIN. CODE §§ 365-195-900–920 (2009). See generally Alan D. Copsey, Including Best Available 
Science in the Designation and Protection of Critical Areas Under the Growth Management Act, 23 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97 (1999). 
44. Honesty in Envtl. Analysis and Legislation (HEAL) v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. 
Hearings Bd., 96 Wash. App. 522, 531–32, 979 P.2d 864, 870 (1999). 
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Heavily populated counties or counties experiencing rapid growth45 
must do more than identify and protect critical areas: Their 
comprehensive land-use plans must include a map identifying urban-
growth areas and areas where only rural land use will be allowed.46 Plans 
must also identify the different regulations that will govern each type of 
land.47 The GMA itself mandates that all urban development must occur 
within urban-growth areas, just as it requires local government to 
regulate rural lands in a way that preserves rural-based economies and 
traditional rural lifestyles.48 
B. GMA Regulations Cause Tension Between Government, Private 
Property Owners, and Developers 
The GMA has created tension between private landowners and local 
governments because it restricts certain uses of property in order to 
control the environmental impact of development49 and flirts with the 
line between impermissible takings or due process violations, and 
permissible uses of government police power.50 Critics have charged that 
the GMA’s thirteen goals are contradictory and irreconcilable. For 
example, regulations to achieve one GMA planning goal—to protect the 
environment—are often a hindrance to another GMA planning goal—to 
encourage economic development.51 Many landowners, especially rural 
landowners who make a living from their land, also feel that GMA 
                                                     
45. Counties that must conform to the GMA include: (1) counties with populations of more than 
50,000 that also experienced more than ten percent population growth between 1985 and 1995; (2) 
counties with populations of more than 50,000 that also experienced more than seventeen percent 
population growth within the past ten years; and (3) counties that, regardless of their populations, 
had population growth exceeding twenty percent in the past ten years. WASH. REV. CODE § 
36.70A.040(1)–(2). 
46. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.030(15), .070; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-300. 
47. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.060, .110; See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 365-195-400–410. 
48. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.011, .020, .070(5)(b), .110; see WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 365-
195-330–335. 
49. WASHINGTON RESEARCH COUNCIL, GMA: GOALS AND PROMISES REVIEWED 7, PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT ACT 1 (2002), available at http://www.researchcouncil. 
org/publications_container/GMA7.pdf [hereinafter PROPERTY RIGHTS]. 
50. See Jeffrey M. Eustis, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Growth Management Act 
Implementation That Avoids Takings and Substantive Due Process Limitations, 16 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 1181, 1181–85 (1993); John M. Groen & Richard M. Stephens, Takings Law, Lucas, 
and the Growth Management Act, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1259, 1300–01 (1993). 
51.  WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(5), (10); BUTLER & KING, supra note 40, § 18.2, at 231; 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 49, at 2. 
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regulations go too far.52 When the Chelan County Commissioners were 
debating GMA regulations, long-time residents framed the issue as 
squarely involving their property rights: “We don’t need some governor 
telling us what to do with our land,” orchard owner Bob Peterson told a 
Seattle newspaper reporter.53 “If you start passing legislation and laws 
that take away from the ability of a property owner to make his income 
or retirement off it, then you’ve gone beyond what’s right.”54 
The GMA requires local governments to provide a public forum 
where these disputes can be aired before decision-makers.55 
Requirements for comprehensive plans include public notice, public 
review and comment,56 and consideration of public feedback.57 But after 
that process, the decision lies in the hands of elected officials, who do 
not have to adopt the policies favored by the majority of those who 
participated in the process.58 
The administrative courts that review GMA-related decisions, Growth 
Management Hearings Boards (GMHBs), give deference to elected 
officials with respect to their decisions about GMA regulations.59 A 
GMHB can set aside a local government plan only if it “is clearly 
erroneous in view of the entire record before the Board and in light of 
the public participation requirements of [the GMA].”60 Parties may also 
agree to waive review before a GMHB and take their dispute directly to 
a county superior court, where the same standard of review—deference 
to elected officials—applies.61 
                                                     
52.  BUTLER & KING, supra note 40, § 18.2, at 231. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.035(2), .140. 
56. Id. § 36.70A.035. 
57. Id. § 36.70A.140. 
58. City of Burien v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 113 Wash. App. 375, 388, 
53 P.3d 1028, 1035 (2002) (holding that the GMA requires public participation in the development 
and amendment of comprehensive land-use plans and regulations, but does not require that local 
government act upon the desires expressed by the public). 
59. STATE OF WASHINGTON GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARD, PRACTICING BEFORE 
THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARDS FOR WASHINGTON STATE 6 (2008) [hereinafter 
HEARINGS BOARD], http://www.gmhb.wa.gov/images/pdf/PracticeHandbookAug2008.pdf. There 
are three GMHBs: the Eastern Board, the Central Puget Sound Board, and the Western Board. Id. at 
4. 
60. City of Burien, 113 Wash. App. at 383, 53 P.3d at 1032 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 
36.70A.320(3) (2002) (emphasis added)); see HEARINGS BOARD, supra note 59, at 6. 
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.295; see WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 242-02-290–295 (2009). 
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While the public has the opportunity to shape comprehensive plans 
through public participation processes, and there are a number of forums 
in which to be heard, rural property owners often perceive this process 
as futile: A conflict between city politicians who cannot identify with the 
perspectives of rural property owners and the rural property owners who 
believe they bear a drastic and disproportionate share of the cost of 
environmental protection.62 
II. WASHINGTON LAW PROVIDES CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR PROPERTY OWNERS 
Property owners with grievances about overreaching government 
land-use decisions have several state law protections. The Washington 
State Constitution provides takings63 and substantive due process 
protections,64 and Washington statutes prevent local governments from 
using their authority to withhold development permits to extract 
revenue-generating concessions.65 
A. Washington Landowners Enjoy Strong Constitutional 
Protections from Overreaching Government Land-Use 
Regulations 
Washington has a long history of vesting broad police powers in local 
governments,66 and the state constitution provides that “[a]ny county, 
city, town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such 
local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with 
general laws.”67 Local governments may create any local regulation so 
long as it is consistent with state law, is aimed at a legitimate 
government purpose, and is reasonably calculated to achieve that 
                                                     
62. See e.g., Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B7; Ervin, Court Fight, supra note 10, at 
B4; Onstot, supra note 10, at 18; BUTLER & KING, supra note 40, § 18.2, at 231. 
63. WASH. CONST. art I, § 16. 
64. Id. § 3. 
65. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.02.020–.090. Washington residents with land disputes also have a 
number of forums in which to be heard, including courts and quasi-judicial and administrative 
forums such as Growth Management Hearings Boards. See supra Part I.B. 
66. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 494, 
497–506 (2000). 
67. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 11. 
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purpose.68 
However, Washington’s constitution provides protections against 
overreaching local land-use regulations for landowners, who can bring 
both takings and substantive due process claims.69 Washington courts 
analyze the takings claim first,70 and start with the “threshold inquiry” of 
whether the regulation amounts to a “physical invasion” or “total taking” 
as well as whether it “destroys or derogates any fundamental attribute of 
property ownership: including the right to possess; to exclude others; or 
to dispose of property.”71 If it is either a physical invasion or total taking, 
the regulation amounts to a taking, and the government must compensate 
the landowner.72 
If the land-use regulation at issue does not involve a physical invasion 
or total taking, courts next ask “whether the challenged regulation 
safeguards the public interest in health, safety, the environment or the 
fiscal integrity of an area.”73 This type of legitimate regulation, the 
Washington State Supreme Court has said, stands in contrast to one that 
“seeks less to prevent a harm than to impose on those regulated the 
requirement of providing an affirmative public benefit.”74 If a court finds 
that the regulation promotes a legitimate purpose and does not destroy a 
fundamental attribute of ownership, the analysis ends: No taking has 
                                                     
68. Spitzer, supra note 66, at 507–09 (citing Petsel, Inc. v. King County, 77 Wash. 2d 144, 154–
55, 459 P.2d 937, 942–43 (1969)); see County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 
719, 419 P.2d 993, 998 (1966); see also In re 14255 53rd Ave. S., 120 Wash. App. 737, 749, 86 
P.3d 222, 227 (2004) (holding no compensation was required where the Washington Department of 
Agriculture undertook to destroy all trees that might be host to the citrus longhorned beetle to 
prevent a widespread infestation because it was a justifiable action to avert public calamity). 
69. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 16. The Washington judiciary uses the Orion-Presbytery test to 
determine whether a takings or substantive due process analysis is appropriate. Spitzer, supra note 
66, at 514–16; ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION, A 
REFERENCE GUIDE 31 (G. Alan Tarr ed., Greenwood Press 2002) (relying on Presbytery of Seattle 
v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990)); see Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 
586, 616–17, 854 P.2d 1, 18 (1993) (Utter, J., concurring) (citing Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329–
30, 787 P.2d at 912–13; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 651, 747 P.2d 1062, 1078 (1987)); 
Orion, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987). 
70. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 594–95, 853 P.2d at 5 (citing Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329, 787 
P.2d at 912). 
71. Id. at 602, 853 P.2d at 10 (citations omitted). 
72. Id. at 602–03, 853 P.2d at 10 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–18 
(1992)). 
73. Id. at 603, 853 P.2d at 10 (relying on Robinson v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 49, 830 P.2d 318, 
327–28 (1992)). 
74. Id. (citing Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 49, 830 P.2d at 328). 
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occurred. However, if a court finds a regulation fails this analysis, it next 
considers “whether [it] substantially advances a legitimate state interest. 
If it does not, the regulation is a taking.”75 If the regulation substantially 
advances a legitimate state purpose, courts balance the state interest in 
the regulation against the economic impact on the landowner, 
considering “(1) the regulation’s economic impact on the property; (2) 
the extent of [its] interference with investment-backed expectations; and 
(3) the character of the government action.”76 If a court finds a taking 
has occurred, “just compensation is mandated.”77 
The Washington State Supreme Court has declared that “[e]ven if a 
regulation is not susceptible to a takings challenge,” courts must still 
“subject [it] to substantive due process scrutiny for reasonableness.”78 
Courts determine “(1) whether the regulation is aimed at achieving a 
legitimate public purpose; (2) whether it uses means that are reasonably 
necessary to achieve that purpose; and (3) whether it is unduly 
oppressive on the landowner.”79 A court invalidates property regulations 
that fail this substantive due process test.80 
B. Washington Law Limits Counties’ Authority to Tax Development 
Washington law limits the power of local governments to extract 
taxes and fees from developers. Section 82.02.020 of the Revised Code 
of Washington (RCW) (the “state preemption statute”) preempts certain 
taxes, fees, and charges relating to development.81 It reads, in relevant 
part: 
Except as provided in RCW 64.34.440 and 82.02.050 through 
82.02.090, no [local government] shall impose any tax, fee, or 
charge, either direct or indirect, on the . . . development . . . of 
land. However, this section does not preclude dedications of 
                                                     
75. Id. at 604, 853 P.2d at 11 (citing Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914; Robinson, 
119 Wash. 2d at 50, 830 P.2d at 328) (emphasis added). 
76. Id. (citing Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335–36, 787 P.2d at 915; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 
51, 830 P.2d at 328). 
77. Id.  
78. Id. at 608, 853 P.2d at 13–14 (citing Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330, 787 P.2d at 912–13). 
79. Id. at 609, 853 P.2d at 14 (quoting Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330, 787 P.2d at 913). 
80. Id. at 616, 853 P.2d at 18 (Utter, J., concurring) (citing Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 
621, 657, 747 P.2d 1062, 1081 (1987)). 
81. RCW 58.17 also addresses state power to regulate plats, subdivisions, and dedications. 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 58.17.010–.210 (2008). 
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land or easements . . . which the [local government] can 
demonstrate are reasonably necessary as a direct result of the 
proposed development . . . . 
  This section does not prohibit voluntary agreements with 
[local governments] that allow a payment in lieu of a dedication 
of land or to mitigate a direct impact that has been identified as a 
consequence of a proposed development . . . .82 
The statute protects developers from having to pay taxes, fees, or 
charges as a condition of development, unless those payments directly 
relate to the impacts of their specific developments. The exceptions in 
RCW 82.02.050 through 82.02.090 allow local governments to impose 
mitigation measures to offset the costs new development will create.83 
Since 1982, RCW 82.02.020 has undergone two substantial 
revisions.84 The first change addressed an issue then before the 
Washington State Supreme Court: whether local governments could use 
their power to approve development applications as a revenue-raising 
device by conditioning approval on payment of fees.85 The legislature 
allowed them to charge only those fees “reasonably necessary as a direct 
result of the proposed development,” and forbade fees that “exceed the 
proportionate share of [the proposed development’s] costs.”86 Put 
simply, the legislature allowed local governments to recoup costs they 
would incur because of a development, but forbade them from inflating 
their balance sheets by using their authority to approve developments to 
                                                     
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020. 
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.050–.090. The legislature added sections 82.02.050 and 82.02.090 
as part of the Growth Management Act. Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wash. 
2d 740, 753 n.9, 49 P.3d 867, 875 n.9 (2002) (citing Growth Management Act, ch. 17, §§ 42–44, 
46–48, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1972, 1994–98, 1999–2001). 
84. Prior to 1982, RCW 82.02.020 addressed state preemption regarding the imposition of taxes 
on retail sales, and use of personal property, pari-mutuel wagering, conveyances, and cigarettes; it 
did not concern development exactions for permitting. Act of May 24, 1979, ch. 196, § 3, 1979 
Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1755, 1758 (amended 1982); Martha S. Lester, Subdivision 
Exactions in Washington: The Controversy Over Imposing Fees On Developers, 59 WASH. L. REV. 
289, 294 n.40 (1984). 
85. Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 810, 650 P.2d 193, 195–96 
(1982) (holding that where local governments exact fees in order to raise revenue, rather than to 
forward a regulatory purpose, those fees constitute an unlawful tax under the Washington State 
Constitution). RCW 82.02.020, as amended in 1982, diminished the significance of the Hillis 
decision because it statutorily limits the ability of municipalities to put conditions on plat approval 
for the development of land. Lester, supra note 84, at 289–90; see Ivy Club Investors Ltd. P’ship v. 
City of Kennewick, 40 Wash. App. 524, 529, 699 P.2d 782, 785 (1985). 
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020. 
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extort money from developers. 
Similar concerns drove the 1990 amendment to RCW 82.02.020, 
enacted in response to the GMA.87 The 1990 amendment authorized 
local governments to recoup certain costs incurred from improving 
public facilities under the GMA,88 but the legislature clearly wanted to 
limit local authorities to only assessing fees for system improvements 
reasonably and proportionately related to that new development.89 For 
example, the statute requires that local governments immediately deposit 
the funds received into an earmarked account, and spend the money on 
the identified purpose within five years.90 If the funds are not spent 
within five years, the developer gets a refund.91 
III. THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON HAS 
INTERPRETED RCW 82.02.020 TO FORBID TAXES, FEES, 
OR CHARGES UNRELATED TO A DEVELOPMENT’S 
IMPACT 
RCW 82.02.020 has generated lawsuits against local governments by 
developers and landowners who claim that land set-aside requirements 
are an impermissible “tax, fee, or charge.”92 The Washington State 
Supreme Court has agreed that local governments impose a tax by 
requiring land set-asides, but have allowed local governments to do just 
that if the requirements are reasonably related to the direct impact of a 
development.93 
                                                     
87. Growth Management Act, ch. 17, §§ 42–44, 46–48, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 
1972, 1994–98, 1999–2001 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.050–.090 (2008)); Isla Verde, 
146 Wash. 2d at 753 n.9, 49 P.3d at 875 n.9. 
88. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.02.050–.090; Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 753 n.9, 49 P.3d at 875 
n.9 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.050(2) (2002)). 
89. Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 753 n.9, 49 P.3d at 875 n.9 (citing WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 82.02.050(2) (2002)). 
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.080 (2008). 
91. Id. 
92. Citizens’ Alliance for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash. App. 649, 653–54, 187 P.3d 786, 788 
(2008), cert. denied, 165 Wash. 2d. 1030, 203 P.3d 378 (2009); Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 753–
58, 49 P.3d at 874–78; Vintage Constr. Co. v. City of Bothell, 83 Wash. App. 605, 607–08, 922 
P.2d 828, 829 (1996); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wash. 2d 261, 264, 877 P.2d 187, 
188–89 (1994). See generally Lester, supra note 84. 
93. E.g., Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 759–61, 49 P.3d at 878–79; Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d at 274–
75, 877 P.2d at 194–95. 
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A. In Trimen, the Court Upheld a County’s Open Space Ordinance 
Because It Was Reasonably Calculated to Remedy an 
Underlying Need 
In Trimen Development Company v. King County,94 the Supreme 
Court of Washington upheld a King County open-space ordinance 
requiring that subdivision developers reserve or dedicate open space for 
the recreational needs of new residents who would live in the 
subdivision.95 Developers also had the option of paying a fee in lieu, 
equivalent in value to the land they would have had to set aside, that the 
county could use only “for the acquisition and development of open 
space, park sites, and recreational facilities . . . where the proposed 
subdivision is located.”96 Trimen Development Company (Trimen) 
objected to the fee in lieu, arguing that it constituted an “unauthorized 
tax.”97 
King County had identified the need for open space in 1981 when the 
county council found a “general and increasing need for parks, open 
spaces and recreational facilities to serve the expanding population of 
the County.”98 The council found that the problem was especially “acute 
at the neighborhood level” because of new subdivisions.99 The county 
commissioned a study in 1985 that found a deficit of more than one 
hundred acres of parks and open space in the Northshore community, 
where Trimen proposed to develop.100 Trimen submitted two Northshore 
plans, one for twenty-one acres divided into seventy-seven lots, and the 
other for twenty-two acres divided into forty-one lots.101 Instead of 
reserving or dedicating a little more than one acre per development as 
open space, Trimen opted to pay fees in lieu.102 
A few months after receiving final approval on both plats, Trimen 
sued, alleging that the county’s fee in lieu was an unlawful “tax, fee, or 
                                                     
94. 124 Wash. 2d 261, 877 P.2d 187 (1994). 
95. Id. at 274, 877 P.2d at 194 (referring to KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 19.38 (1981)). 
96. Id. at 265, 877 P.2d at 189. 
97. Id. at 268–69, 877 P.2d at 191. 
98. Id. at 264, 877 P.2d at 189. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 274, 877 P.2d at 194. 
101. Id. at 266, 877 P.2d at 190. 
102. Id. at 267, 877 P.2d at 190. 
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charge” under RCW 82.02.020.103 The state supreme court rejected that 
argument: “We have previously stated that ‘if the primary purpose of the 
legislation is regulation rather than raising revenue, the legislation 
cannot be classified as a tax even if a burden or charge is imposed.’”104 
Trimen also argued that the ordinance conflicted with RCW 82.02.020 
because the county had failed to establish that the land reservations and 
dedications or associated fees were “reasonably necessary as a direct 
result of the proposed development or plat.”105 Trimen argued that the 
county had arrived at its conclusion by applying a mechanical formula: 
“Under King County’s fee exaction methodology, a publicly accessible 
swimming pool, tennis court, golf course, soccer field, and baseball 
diamond could all be across the street from [the proposed subdivisions], 
and the exact same park fee would be assessed . . . .”106 According to 
Trimen, state law gave it the right to a site-specific evaluation. 
The Court disagreed. King County based its formula on information 
contained in the 1985 comprehensive report, which had identified a 
significant lack of parks and open space in the very area where Trimen 
was hoping to build 112 homes with an average of three occupants 
each.107 For the Court, that was enough: “King County correctly 
assessed the direct impact of Trimen’s developments on the demand for 
neighborhood parks and imposed a fee reasonably necessary to mitigate 
these impacts.”108 
B. In Isla Verde, the Court Invalidated a City’s Open Space Set-
Aside Requirement Because the City Did Not Show a 
Reasonably Calculated Relationship Between the Regulation 
and the Proposed Development 
In Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas,109 the 
                                                     
103. Id. at 268–69, 877 P.2d at 191. 
104. Id. at 270, 877 P.2d at 192 (quoting Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 
804, 809, 650 P.2d 193, 195 (1982)) (internal citation omitted). 
105. Id. at 273–74, 877 P.2d at 193–94 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (1982)). 
106. Brief of Appellant at 25–26, Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wash. 2d 261, 877 P.2d 
187 (1994) (No. 57881-8). 
107. Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d at 274, 877 P.2d at 194. 
108. Id. at 275, 877 P.2d at 194 (“King County’s fee in lieu of dedication is calculated based on 
zoning, projected population, and the assessed value of the land that would have been dedicated or 
reserved. King County’s assessment of fees in lieu of dedication are specific to the site . . . .”). 
109. 146 Wash. 2d 740, 49 P.3d 867 (2002). 
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Supreme Court of Washington invalidated a Camas Municipal Code 
provision that applied an open space set-aside of thirty percent to every 
proposed subdivision.110 The city council had great discretion, and could 
waive the requirement in favor of a fee in lieu upon two findings: (1) 
that the set-aside “would not fulfill the intent or purpose of useful 
common open space,” and (2) “that a payment of an equivalent fee in 
lieu . . . is appropriate.”111 Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. (Isla 
Verde) objected to the regulation, and the Washington State Supreme 
Court struck it down because it did not bear the requisite relationship to 
the proposed development under RCW 82.02.020.112 
In 1995, Isla Verde had submitted a proposed 13.4-acre development 
that included fifty-one homes.113 Many Camas residents spoke out 
against the proposal, in part because the property had steep slopes of 
forest containing wildlife, including two species being monitored by the 
Fish and Wildlife Service: the pileated woodpecker and ringneck 
snake.114 The fire marshal also expressed concern about the fact that 
only one road provided access to the development, making emergency 
response service difficult during wildfires.115 The city council approved 
Isla Verde’s development proposal notwithstanding those concerns, but 
required Isla Verde to set aside the full thirty percent of the land, 
refusing to accept a fee in lieu.116 
Isla Verde sought review of the city’s decision, alleging that the City 
of Camas had violated its constitutional property rights and that the set-
aside requirement was an unlawful tax.117 The trial court and court of 
appeals agreed, both finding that the regulation amounted to an 
unconstitutional taking.118 The city petitioned the Washington State 
                                                     
110. Id. at 765, 49 P.3d at 881 (regarding CAMAS, WASH., MUN. CODE § 18.62.020(A) (1991), 
invalidated by Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d 740, 49 P.3d 867 (2002)). 
111. Id. at 747 n.3, 49 P.3d at 871 n.3 (quoting CAMAS, WASH., MUN. CODE §17.12.090(E) 
(1991)). 
112. Id. at 763–64, 49 P.3d at 880. 
113. Id. at 745–46, 49 P.3d at 871. 
114. Id. at 748–49, 49 P.3d at 872. 
115. Id. at 746, 767, 49 P.3d at 871, 882. There were two issues in this case: (1) whether the City 
of Camas’s open-space ordinance was proper; and (2) whether the City of Camas could require Isla 
Verde to construct a secondary limited access road on the development for emergency vehicles. Id. 
at 745, 49 P.3d at 867. This Note focuses on the former issue. 
116. Id. at 749–50, 49 P.3d at 873. 
117. Id. at 750, 49 P.3d at 873. 
118. Id. 
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Supreme Court for review.119 The Court declined to reach the 
constitutional issue, deciding instead that the set-aside regulation was an 
unlawful “tax, fee, or charge” under RCW 82.02.020.120 
The Court concluded that a land dedication qualifies as a tax.121 The 
issue then became whether the thirty percent set-aside required of Isla 
Verde was “reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed 
development.”122 The city argued that the case was like Trimen, in that 
the city preferred to keep a certain percentage of land as open space and 
required developers to set aside that percentage.123 The Court was not 
persuaded: In Trimen, King County based its findings on a 
comprehensive study,124 whereas the record in Isla Verde indicated that 
the City of Camas was relying on a bare legislative determination of the 
need for open space.125 Furthermore, King County had studied the 
particular community and its needs for parks,126 whereas the City of 
Camas applied its thirty percent open-space requirement to any proposed 
subdivision in Camas.127 King County could directly trace the need for 
open space to the 112 homes Trimen hoped to build.128 The City of 
Camas could make no such showing with respect to Isla Verde.129 The 
                                                     
119. Id. at 751, 49 P.3d at 873. 
120. Id. at 752, 49 P.3d at 874 (“We adhere to the fundamental principle that if a case can be 
decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding constitutional 
issues.”). 
121. Id. at 757–58, 49 P.3d at 877 (“The exclusionary language of the statute demonstrates that 
the prohibited charges are not limited to monetary charges. . . . [A] required dedication of land or 
easement is a tax, fee or charge.” (citing San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 24, 
735 P.2d 673, 674–75 (1987))). 
122. Id. at 759, 49 P.3d at 878. 
123. Id. at 760, 49 P.3d at 878. 
124. Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wash. 2d 261, 274, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (1994). 
125. Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 761, 49 P.3d at 879 (“We reject the City’s argument that it 
satisfies its burden under RCW 82.02.020 merely through a legislative determination . . . .”). In his 
concurrence, Justice Johnson stated, “[t]he record before us regarding the contested open space 
condition is simply insufficient to determine its appropriateness under RCW 82.02.020.” Id. at 772, 
49 P.3d at 884 (Johnson, J., concurring). He further opined that the Court should have remanded the 
case for further development of the record with respect to evidence showing the relationship 
between the open space condition and the development. Id. at 773, 49 P.3d at 885 (Johnson, J., 
concurring). 
126. Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d at 274, 877 P.2d at 194. 
127. Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 764–65, 49 P.3d at 881 (regarding CAMAS, WASH., MUN. CODE 
§ 18.62.020(A) (1991), invalidated by Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d 740, 49 P.3d 867). 
128. Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d at 274, 877 P.2d at 194. 
129. Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 762–63, 49 P.3d at 879–80. 
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differences were significant: 
We have repeatedly held, as the statute requires, that 
development conditions must be tied to a specific, identified 
impact of a development on a community. RCW 82.020.020 
does not permit conditions that satisfy a “reasonably necessary” 
standard for all new development collectively; it specifically 
requires that a condition be “reasonably necessary as a direct 
result of the proposed development or plat.”130 
IV. KING COUNTY IMPLEMENTED STRINGENT CLEARING 
LIMITATIONS ON RURAL LAND OVER RURAL 
LANDOWNERS’ OBJECTIONS 
King County is home to about 1.9 million people; nearly one third of 
them are urbanites of Seattle.131 But nearly twenty percent of the 
county’s population lives on large tracts of unincorporated land,132 
predominantly zoned for rural, forest, and agricultural uses.133 The 
county’s urban center creates environmental problems, especially 
stormwater runoff that carries chemicals into rivers and streams.134 One 
way to alleviate the problem of chemical runoff is to keep rural land in 
its natural condition because natural soil and root systems absorb 
pollutants before they reach waterways; concrete and asphalt do not.135 
In 2004, to protect local rivers from pollution and to prevent increased 
flooding, the King County Council’s growth management committee 
proposed an ordinance that prohibited rural landowners from clearing 
                                                     
130. Id. at 761, 49 P.3d at 879 (internal citations omitted). The court upheld that condition, noting 
that it was a constitutional exercise of police power. Id. at 763–74, 49 P.3d at 880. For further 
discussion about judicial interpretation of police power as applied to land-use issues in Washington, 
see Spitzer, supra note 66, at 511. 
131. ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, § III, at 26; see ANNUAL GROWTH 2004, supra note 
4. 
132. ANNUAL GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, § VII, at 116. The estimated 2008 population for 
unincorporated King County is 341,150. Id. 
133. KING COUNTY, BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE, VOLUME I: A REVIEW OF SCIENCE LITERATURE 
§ 1.2, at 1-7 (2004) [hereinafter BAS I]. About eighty-two percent of the county’s 2130 square miles 
of land are part of unincorporated King County. Id. Employment in agriculture, fishing, forestry, 
and hunting accounted for an estimated 2651 jobs in 2006 in King County at large. ANNUAL 
GROWTH 2008, supra note 4, § II, at 15. 
134. BAS I, supra note 133, § 6.2.3, at 6-17; see id. § 7.2.5, at 7-14–15. 
135. Id. § 7.2.5, at 7-14–19. 
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many of the trees and other vegetation on their land.136 Rural landowners 
objected throughout a contentious two-year public comment period,137 
arguing that the ordinance unfairly allocated the burden to prevent 
environmental harm on the county’s rural community138 and that it 
threatened traditional rural activities like horse grazing.139 The full 
county council, split along party lines,140 narrowly passed the ordinance 
in October 2004.141 
A. King County Proposed Revisions to Its Clearing and Grading 
Regulations to Protect King County’s River Systems, Which Are 
Threatened by Urban Stormwater Runoff 
King County’s six major river systems are fed by mountain rain and 
snowmelt.142 However, the numerous streams of the county are 
infiltrated by stormwater runoff from developed areas.143 Because 
developed areas are generally covered by impervious surfaces, that 
runoff carries with it sediment and chemicals that would otherwise be 
absorbed and filtered by the terrain in its natural, undeveloped state.144 
This runoff causes alterations in natural habitat structures and changes to 
water chemistry that impact aquatic species, causing lower reproductive 
                                                     
136. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14 (2004), available at http://www.metrokc. 
gov/mkcc/cao/clearing_grading_15053.pdf (codified at KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE tit. 
16.82.150,152 (2008), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation /kc_code.aspx). 
137. Onstot, supra note 10, at 17; see also Ervin, Panel Approves, supra note 8, at B1. 
138. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B7. “[R]ural landowners mounted months of 
protests and blasted [the ordinance] as ‘a massive land grab’ that violates their property rights. . . . 
Members of the Republican minority on the County Council blasted the package as unfairly putting 
the burden of environmental protection on rural residents, while city dwellers and suburbanites 
shoulder little of the burden.” Id. at B1, B7. 
139. Summary of Changes to Executive Proposal in Proposed Substitute Ordinance 2004-0124, 
Clearing and Grading Ordinance at 3, Ex. 22, Consolidated Index, Citizens’ Alliance v. Sims, No. 
04-2-13831-9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Snohomish County, filed Oct. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Changes to 
Executive Proposal]; Constantine Proposes More Flexibility for Regulations Protecting Critical 
Areas in King County (Sept. 16, 2004), http://www.metrokc.gov/ mkcc/News/2004/0904/DC_ 
CAO_Striker.htm [hereinafter More Flexibility]. 
140. Ervin, Restrictions Go Too Far, supra note 8, at A1. 
141. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 §§ 14–15. 
142. BAS I, supra note 133, § 3.2.1, at 3-1. The White River is the only glacial system in King 
County. Id. 
143. Id. § 3.2.3, at 3-2. 
144. Id. § 7.2.5, at 7-14–7-15; id. § 6.2.3, at 6-17. 
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rates, vulnerabilities to predators, and modified migration patterns.145 
Impervious surfaces also increase the potential for flooding. Public 
agencies have built levees and dug channels to direct and store 
stormwater, but these solutions have created problems of their own, 
including increased water velocity and stream bank erosion,146 and an 
actual reduction in overall floodwater storage capacity.147 These impacts 
of development on rivers and streams often deprive fish and wildlife of 
passable corridors and bring them into contact with harmful chemical 
runoff.148 
King County commissioned a comprehensive scientific study in 2002, 
published in 2004, that proposed a more natural solution: leave rural 
land in its natural state so it can absorb stormwater runoff before it 
reaches rivers and streams.149 The study, which relied on the 
contributions from more than twenty reputable scientists,150 concluded 
that the best way to prevent chemical runoff and maintain “physical, 
biological and chemical connectivity” between rivers and the 
surrounding land was to leave forestland in its natural state.151 
Specifically, the study concluded that King County should limit 
impervious surfaces to ten percent of rural land and retain sixty-five 
percent of the natural forest cover and vegetation in rural areas.152 
King County revised its proposed clearing and grading ordinance in 
response to public comments,153 but the ordinance substantially 
                                                     
145. Id. § 7.2.5, at 7-14–7-15; id. § 2.2, at 2-4. 
146. Id. § 3.2.3, at 3-4. Increased water velocity can cause “channel scour.” Id. This means 
erosion of stream banks (usually along their outside curves) and streambeds. Lake Whatcom 
Management Program Glossary of Terms, http://lakewhatcom.wsu.edu/display.asp?ID=67 (last 
visited Jun. 22, 2009). 
147. BAS I, supra note 133, § 3.2.3, at 3-4. A reduction in floodwater storage is problematic 
because it can cause increased flooding and prevents water from traveling in its natural patterns 
among wetlands. Id. 
148. Id. § 3.2.3, at 3-3–4; id. § 3.3, at 3-10. 
149. Id. § 3.2.3, at 3-3; KING COUNTY, BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE, VOL. II: ASSESSMENT OF 
PROPOSED ORDINANCES § 4.2, at 4-5 (2004), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/property/ 
permits/codes/CAO.aspx#best [hereinafter BAS II]. 
150. BAS I, supra note 133, App. C: Science Experts, at C-1–33; see Ervin, County Approves, 
supra note 10, at B7 (reporting King County Executive Ron Sims’s rebuttal of accusations that the 
Best Available Science report was not good science). 
151. BAS I, supra note 133, § 3.2.3, at 3-4. 
152. Id. § 7.2.8, at 7-30 (suggesting ten percent limitation on impervious surfaces and a thirty-
five percent clearing limitation). 
153. Changes to Executive Proposal, supra note 139, at 3; see More Flexibility, supra note 139, 
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conformed to the study findings154 requiring landowners in rural areas to 
maintain sixty-five percent of their land in its natural state.155 The 
proposed revisions were included as part of King County’s critical areas 
ordinance update.156 
B. Rural Residents Opposed King County’s Revised Clearing and 
Grading Regulations 
Members of the rural community responded to the proposed clearing 
and grading ordinance revisions with outrage, arguing vociferously 
against the proposal during at least fifteen public meetings.157 Such 
stringent clearing limitations, they said, would make their traditional 
rural lifestyle impossible, since keeping horses, farming, and home-
building all require landowners to clear vegetation and trees.158 
County leaders amended the proposal to respond to a few of those 
concerns, including adding a grandfather provision for lots already 
cleared, and allowing owners of lots smaller than five acres to clear fifty 
percent of their land.159 They also inserted a “Rural Stewardship Plan” 
and “Farm Management Plan,” which allow landowners to petition for 
permission to clear larger areas in a way consistent with the county’s 
                                                     
at 1–4. 
154. BAS II, supra note 149, § 6.2, at 6-2. 
155. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14 (2004), available at http://www.metrokc. 
gov/mkcc/cao/clearing_grading_15053.pdf (codified at KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE §§ 16.82.150, 
.152 (2008), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation /kc_code.aspx). 
156. The King County Code requires updates of its comprehensive plan, including critical areas 
ordinances, every five years. KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 20.12.010(A) (2008); see also WASH. 
REV. CODE § 36.70A.130(4)(a) (2008) (requiring updates of county comprehensive plans every 
seven years); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-195-900 (2009) (requiring updates of county 
comprehensive plans every five years, if needed for compliance with the GMA). Clearing and 
grading ordinance 15053 accompanied King County Ordinances 15051 and 15052, which amended 
the critical areas and stormwater ordinances, respectively. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 
15051 (2004), available at http://www.metrokc.gov/mkcc/cao/critical_areas_15051.pdf (codified at 
KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 21A.24 (2008), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/ 
legislation/kc_code.aspx); KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15052 (2004), available at 
http://www.metrokc.gov/mkcc/cao/stormwater_15052.pdf, (codified at KING COUNTY, WASH., 
CODE §§ 9.04, 9.12 (2008), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation/kc_code. 
aspx). 
157. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B1; Ervin, Court Fight, supra note 10, at B1; 
Ervin, Panel Approves, supra note 8, at B1, B4; Onstot, supra note 10, at 17. 
158. See Changes to Executive Proposal, supra note 139, at 3; More Flexibility, supra note 139, 
at 1. 
159. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14. 
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underlying goals of protecting rivers and native fish species.160 As 
passed, the ordinance limits clearing and the building of permanent 
structures, but allows landowners to use their property for certain 
logging and recreational activities.161 
The changes did little to ameliorate the opposition of rural 
landowners: “My take is it’s stealing—out and out stealing,” said 
resident Marshall Brenden. “They’re taking 65 percent of your land that 
you fought years to pay for, paid mortgages on, and now you can’t use 
it.”162 Opponents of the ordinance continued their protest through the 
October 2004 county council meeting where the ultimate decision was 
made.163 The meeting lasted until late at night.164 In the end, King 
County Ordinance 15053 passed 7–6, divided along party lines, with 
Democrats voting in favor.165 Republican council members, who largely 
represented rural areas of King County, did not hide their anger. Some 
argued that the best available science showed no need for such strict 
regulations.166 Republican Rob McKenna described the ordinance as one 
of “the most draconian land-use regulations in the state, if not the 
country.”167 
V. THE WASHINGTON COURT OF APPEALS HELD THAT 
THE KING COUNTY ORDINANCE WAS AN UNLAWFUL 
TAX 
For rural landowners opposed to the new ordinance the fight was not 
over. Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights (Citizens’ Alliance), a 
political action committee that had formed in 2003 during the public 
hearings process,168 filed a lawsuit against King County in March of 
                                                     
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Private Property May Become Preserved, FOXNEWS, Jul. 10, 2004, http://foxnews.com/ 
printer_friendly_story/0,3566,124358,00.html. 
163. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B7; Onstot, supra note 10, at 18. 
164. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B1. 
165. Onstot, supra note 10, at 17. 
166. Ervin, County Approves, supra note 10, at B7 (“Republicans also argued that the county’s 
analysis of ‘the best available science’ didn’t show the need for stricter regulation.”). 
167. Id. at B7. Rob McKenna is currently Washington’s attorney general. Washington State 
Office of the Attorney General—About the Office—About Rob McKenna, http://www.atg.wa.gov/ 
AboutTheOffice/default.aspx (last visited August 20, 2009). 
168. Citizens’ Alliance for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash. App. 649, 654, 187 P.3d 786, 789 
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2005.169 Citizens’ Alliance argued that the clearing and grading 
regulations ran afoul of RCW 82.02.020 as an unlawful tax, fee, or 
charge,170 just like the thirty percent land set-aside in Isla Verde.171 King 
County disagreed with the comparison of facts to Isla Verde. The county 
argued that because the clearing limitations had been passed pursuant to 
the Growth Management Act, RCW 82.02.020 did not apply.172 Further, 
the county asserted that the controlling case was Trimen, and the 
clearing limits were like the Trimen open-space requirements—
necessary to accomplish a legitimate public goal and based on the best 
available science.173 The trial court agreed with the county and granted 
its motion for summary judgment.174 Citizens’ Alliance appealed.175 
The court of appeals heard oral arguments on January 23, 2008,176 and 
considered the issue of whether the King County clearing and grading 
ordinance violated RCW 82.02.020.177 It issued its decision in favor of 
                                                     
(2008), cert. denied, 165 Wash. 2d. 1030, 203 P.3d 378 (2009); Onstot, supra note 10, at 18. 
169. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 654, 187 P.3d at 789. The Snohomish County 
Superior Court was a proper venue for the action under RCW 36.01.050, which states that actions 
against any county may be commenced in the superior court of such county or the superior court of 
either of the two nearest judicial districts. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.01.050 (2008). 
170. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 654, 187 P.3d at 789. Citizens’ Alliance also alleged 
constitutional violations of substantive due process. Id.; First Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 
6–7. See supra Part II.A for discussion of substantive due process as it pertains to the Washington 
State Judiciary’s evaluation of land-use issues. 
171. Plaintiff’s Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, 
Citizens’ Alliance, No. 04-2-13831-9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Snohomish County, filed Aug. 30, 2006). 
Both the constitutional and statutory claims came as a facial challenge; there was no proposed 
development available for an as-applied challenge to the ordinance. See First Amended Complaint, 
supra note 14, passim. 
172. Defendant King County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on RCW 
82.02.020 Claim at 40–43, Citizens’ Alliance, No. 04-2-13831-9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Snohomish 
County, filed Sep. 27, 2006). 
173. Id. at 48–55. 
174. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 655, 187 P.3d at 789; Order Granting King County’s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on RCW 82.02.020 Claim and Entry of Final Judgment in 
Favor of King County at 3, Citizens’ Alliance, No. 04-2-13831-9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Snohomish 
County Dec. 22, 2006). 
175. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. 2d at 655, 187 P.3d at 789. Notice of Appeal, Citizens’ 
Alliance, No. 04-2-13831-9 (Superior Court for the State of Washington, Snohomish County, filed 
Jan. 12, 2007). 
176. Court of Appeals Division I, Oral Argument Calendar for Wednesday, January 23, 2008. 
177. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. 2d at 653, 187 P.3d at 788. The court of appeals determined 
that its discussion and holding pertaining to the statutory violation resolved the issue, and did not 
analyze the substantive due process claim. Id. at 671, 187 P.3d at 797. 
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Citizens’ Alliance on July 7, 2008,178 reversing the trial court’s ruling. 
The “threshold questions” were whether the clearing limitations 
imposed a “tax, fee, or charge,” and if so, whether they fell within one of 
the exceptions in RCW 82.02.020.179 The court held that the ordinance 
was subject to the statute, that it qualified as an “in kind indirect ‘tax, 
fee, or charge’” under RCW 82.02.020,180 and that it did not fall within 
the statutory exceptions.181 In making its finding, the court relied almost 
entirely on Isla Verde.182 In fact, the court described the City of Camas 
set-aside at issue in Isla Verde as “not materially distinguishable” from 
King County’s clearing limitations.183 
The court rejected King County’s argument that because the clearing 
limitation’s purpose was land-use regulation, and not the raising of 
revenue, Trimen was controlling precedent, meaning the ordinance 
“[did] not constitute a ‘tax, fee, or charge.’”184 However, the court did 
not expressly find that the main purpose of the ordinance was to raise 
revenue. Instead, it relied on the conclusion that “[t]he plain words of the 
statute indicate that its application is not limited to ‘taxes,’”185 and 
characterized Washington case law as “clear that RCW 82.02.020 
applies to ordinances that may require developers to set aside land as a 
condition of development.”186 The court also rejected King County’s 
argument that the clearing ordinance could not possibly violate the state 
preemption statute because it had been passed pursuant to mandatory 
GMA requirements imposed by the state legislature.187 The GMA did 
                                                     
178. Id. at 649, 187 P.3d at 786. On the panel for the Washington State Court of Appeals, 
Division I: Judge Cox (writing), Judge Agid, Judge Ellington. Id. at 652, 672, 187 P.3d at 788, 798. 
179. Id. at 657, 187 P.3d at 790. 
180. Id. at 653, 187 P.3d at 788. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 660–61, 665–66, 187 P.3d at 791–92, 794–95. 
183. Id. at 661, 187 P.3d at 792. For the court, the only distinguishing fact was that King County 
had not offered a “payment of a fee in lieu” exception, whereas the City of Camas provided for this 
alternative. Id. 
184. Id. at 662, 187 P.3d at 792; see Defendant King County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment on RCW 82.02.020 Claim, supra note 172, at 44–48; see also Hillis Homes, 
Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 810, 650 P.2d 193, 195–96 (1982) (holding that where 
local governments exact fees in order to raise revenue, rather than to forward a regulatory purpose, 
those fees constitute an unlawful tax under the Washington State Constitution). 
185. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 662, 187 P.3d at 793. 
186. Id. at 663, 187 P.3d at 793 (citing Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 
146 Wash. 2d 740, 758, 49 P.3d 867, 877 (2002)). 
187. Id. 
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not require the particular clearing limitations the county had approved, 
said the court, and “no Washington law supports the County’s argument 
that [the ordinance] is exempt from the requirements of RCW 82.02.020 
because it was adopted in response to the State’s GMA requirements.”188 
Having determined that the clearing and grading ordinance was an in-
kind indirect tax, fee, or charge under RCW 82.02.020,189 the court 
turned to the next threshold question: Did it fall within one of the state-
preemption statute’s listed exceptions? Specifically, was it “reasonably 
necessary as a direct result of the proposed development”?190 The court 
stated that this second question was more difficult to answer.191 To 
prevail, King County would have to bear the burden of showing that 
there was a “nexus” and “rough proportionality” between the clearing 
limitations and the proposed development.192 These were two separate 
requirements, said the court, and the trial court had erred by addressing 
only the “nexus” requirement.193 While King County had met its burden 
of showing a nexus by submitting “a wealth of unchallenged 
evidence,”194 it had failed to show rough proportionality.195 It could not 
meet that burden, said the court, because it had not conducted a site-
specific evaluation of the proposed development.196 The county’s 
attempt to rely on Trimen, in which there was no site-specific evaluation, 
again failed. The court characterized Trimen as “mak[ing] clear that the 
reason the ordinance at issue there satisfied the statute was because its 
requirement was reasonably necessary as a direct result of Trimen’s 
development.”197 Because King County failed to meet its burden, the 
court held that the ordinance was an illegal “in kind indirect ‘tax, fee, or 
charge’” on new development, and remanded the matter to the trial 
                                                     
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 661–62, 187 P.3d at 792. 
190. Id. at 665, 187 P.3d at 794 (emphasis omitted). 
191. Id. 
192. Id. The court’s “nexus” and “rough proportionality” language came from federal takings law 
under the Fifth Amendment. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) 
(requiring a “nexus” between permit condition and purpose of permit condition); Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1986) (requiring “rough proportionality” between land use regulation 
and proposed development). 
193. Citizens’ Alliance, 145 Wash. App. at 665, 187 P.3d at 794. 
194. Id. at 669–70, 187 P.3d at 796. 
195. Id. at 670, 180 P.3d at 796. 
196. Id. at 668–69, 187 P.3d at 796. 
197. Id. at 667, 668–69, 187 P.3d at 795, 796. 
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court, directing it to enter an order for summary judgment in favor of 
Citizens’ Alliance.198 
The Washington State Supreme Court denied King County’s petition 
for review on March 3, 2009.199 
VI. THE COURT ERRED IN DECIDING CITIZENS’ ALLIANCE 
V. SIMS, A DECISION THAT UNDERMINES THE GMA 
AND COMPREHENSIVE LAND-USE PLANNING 
The Washington State Court of Appeals was wrong to conclude that 
King County’s clearing ordinance was not a direct result of the proposed 
development for one simple reason: There was no proposed development 
in the case. The court’s mistake was in analyzing the issue under the 
wrong body of law: Citizens’ Alliance had brought a facial challenge,200 
which meant there was no specific proposed development for the county 
to evaluate, and the court’s application of RCW 82.02.020 was 
erroneous. Alternatively, the court should have evaluated the restrictions 
in question as a possible regulatory taking or a violation of substantive 
due process.201 
The court’s ruling rejects the public policy choices inherent in the 
GMA, and it represents judicial intrusion into legislative decision-
making. This could have starkly negative consequences for Washington 
land-use planning. The legislature passed RCW 82.02.020 to prevent 
local governments from exacting fees from landowners and developers 
as a condition for approval of a specific development. It did not intend 
for the law to preclude all comprehensive local land-use planning, yet 
this is exactly the implicit effect of the court’s ruling. 
                                                     
198. Id. at 672, 187 P.3d at 797–98. 
199. Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights v. Sims, 165 Wash. 2d 1030, 203 P.3d 378 (2009). 
The King County clearing and grading ordinance is still technically in effect, but the county will not 
enforce it. Questions and Answers Regarding Court Rulings on King County’s Clearing Limits in 
the Critical Areas Ordinance, http://www.kingcounty.gov/property/permits/codes/CAO/Court 
RulingsQA.aspx (last visited July 15, 2009). 
200. The handling of “facial challenges” versus “as-applied” challenges by Washington courts is 
an extensive topic that is not addressed in detail in this Note. 
201. See supra Part II for explanation of regulatory taking and substantive due process 
challenges. 
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A. The Court Erred When It Applied RCW 82.02.020 Because 
There Was No “Proposed Development” 
The Washington State Legislature adopted RCW 82.02.020 to prevent 
local governments from leveraging their power to approve development 
plats by exacting revenue from developers. The statute is designed to 
ensure that developers carry only their fair share of the cost of 
community infrastructure or environmental protection. The statute 
clearly targets parties that have proposed developments, as it allows 
dedications, easements, or fees in lieu that are “reasonably necessary as 
a direct result of the proposed development.”202 
The court was mistaken in relying on Trimen and Isla Verde, because 
neither case is on point. In both cases, the Supreme Court of Washington 
was able to consider the reasonableness of local government regulations 
and fees as applied to proposed development because actual proposals 
for development were at issue: In Trimen, a developer had proposed two 
plats, encompassing forty-three acres and 118 homes;203 in Isla Verde, 
the developer had proposed a thirteen-acre development with fifty-one 
homes.204 In Citizens’ Alliance v. King County, no development had 
been proposed. 
Trimen and Isla Verde do not mandate the outcome in Citizens’ 
Alliance. Instead, they recognize King County’s authority to pass an 
ordinance like the clearing and grading limitations at issue in Citizens’ 
Alliance. In Trimen, the court recognized that RCW 82.02.020 does not 
affect a local government’s power to pass reasonably calculated 
comprehensive land-use regulations,205 and it refused to characterize the 
open-space set-aside as an unlawful tax under the state preemption 
statute.206 Further, the court ruled that the fee charged the developer was 
“reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development” 
based on data from an area study commissioned by the county 
                                                     
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (2008) (emphasis added). 
203. See Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wash. 2d 261, 266, 877 P.2d 187, 190 (1994) 
(noting that Trimen proposed 2 developments with 77 and 41 lots for detached family homes, 
respectively, for a total of 118 lots). 
204. Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wash. 2d 740, 746, 49 P.3d 867, 871 
(2002). 
205. Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d at 275, 877 P.2d at 194; see id. at 270, 877 P.2d at 192. 
206. Id. at 270, 877 P.2d at 192. 
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government.207 The King County clearing and grading ordinance at issue 
in Citizens’ Alliance is indistinguishable from the Trimen open-space 
set-aside: After a long and detailed area study, King County concluded 
that clearing and grading limitations were required to preserve water 
quality and prevent increased flooding.208 If a landowner were to 
propose a specific development, the county would be able to rely on its 
study findings in considering other site-specific limitations that might be 
necessary to further the county’s underlying goals. It bears repeating that 
consideration of RCW 82.02.020 is unnecessary in this case because no 
one proposed to develop a specific site. 
Dictum in Isla Verde also suggests that King County has authority to 
impose its clearing and grading ordinance. The Isla Verde court 
acknowledged a local government’s inherent police power authority to 
regulate land use by passing zoning ordinances,209 but found that the 
City of Camas land set-aside requirement could not be defended as a 
zoning ordinance because it applied to all proposed developments, 
“regardless of zoning.”210 Presumably, if the City of Camas set-aside 
requirement had tracked a reasonably calculated zoning classification, its 
regulation would have been permissible. The Isla Verde court also 
distinguished Trimen, noting that the comprehensive area study 
supporting the need for open space in Trimen fulfilled the “reasonably 
necessary” component of the state preemption statute, whereas the mere 
legislative determination of that need in Isla was insufficient.211 The 
King County clearing limitation was based on a comprehensive area 
study and was applied only to land zoned rural residential.212 
While RCW 82.02.020 does not apply in this case, it does not follow 
that King County is unlimited in the land-use restrictions it may impose. 
The county is subject to important state constitutional limitations, 
including substantive due process requirements and the prohibition on 
                                                     
207. Id. 
208. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14A (2004), available at http://www.metrokc. 
gov/mkcc/cao/clearing_grading_15053.pdf (codified at KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 16.82.150A 
(2005), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation/kc_code.aspx). 
209. See Isla Verde, 146 Wash. 2d at 763–65, 49 P.3d at 880–81. 
210. Id. at 764–65, 49 P.3d at 880–81. 
211. Id. at 760–61, 49 P.3d at 878–79. 
212. KING COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 15053 § 14A; BAS II, supra note 149, § 6, at 6-1–14; 
see Citizens’ Alliance for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash. App. 649, 653, 669–70, 187 P.3d 786, 
788, 796 (2008), cert. denied, 165 Wash. 2d. 1030, 203 P.3d 378 (2009). 
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takings. The court of appeals should have analyzed King County’s 
regulation under those protections and precedents. 
It is critically important that courts use the correct body of law to 
evaluate land-use regulations. If they require local governments to 
evaluate a possible regulation’s potential impact on every affected parcel 
of land, regardless of whether a development has been proposed there, 
attempts at comprehensive land-use planning will fail. 
B. Citizens’ Alliance v. Sims Undermines the Objectives of the 
GMA and Has Dire Implications for the Future of Land-Use 
Planning in Washington 
The Washington State Legislature passed the GMA to promote 
comprehensive land-use planning in a climate of rapid population 
growth and urban sprawl.213 Comprehensive land-use planning requires 
consideration of locales in their entirety. In the case of environmental 
planning, planners must evaluate entire ecosystems, ignoring artificial 
property lines. Stormwater runs faster over impervious surfaces 
regardless of who owns the land, and stormwater runoff carries sediment 
and toxins into Washington’s river systems. In addition to deciding upon 
a statewide course that includes comprehensive land-use planning, the 
GMA also represents a legislative determination that local government is 
in the best position to create those plans.214 The GMA includes several 
different environmental and economic goals—some of which 
occasionally conflict—and the legislature vested the task of balancing 
those goals in the local governments, which represent the communities 
the regulations will affect.215 
In Citizens’ Alliance, the Washington Court of Appeals undermined 
those legislative priorities. If local governments have to evaluate each 
potentially affected parcel of land as part of their comprehensive land-
use planning, those plans will fail simply because comprehensive 
planning requires laws of general application. Such a result is directly at 
odds with the GMA. Moreover, it runs counter to the very foundation of 
local police powers, which exist to benefit the health, safety, and welfare 
of the community overall. 
                                                     
213. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 880–81. 
214. See supra Part I. 
215. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.040, .120 (2008); Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 896–
98. 
Williamson_Comment_DPTed.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/31/2009  7:21 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:491, 2009 
520 
The decision in Citizens’ Alliance also undermines the goals of the 
GMA by making comprehensive planning prohibitively expensive and 
inefficient, without a corresponding benefit. In fact, it undermines 
property development by forcing local governments to commission 
environmental evaluations of each parcel of property in order to reach a 
conclusion based on the best available science, even if an analysis of the 
general area would achieve the same results. Because of limited public 
funds, the cost of individualized studies would likely be imposed on 
property owners and developers. Such an intrusion onto local property 
would also be an unwanted invasion from the private property owner’s 
perspective. It is difficult to identify any benefit from such a mandate 
other than satisfying the court’s new legal requirement. Furthermore, the 
newly required evaluations would cause long delays while potential 
regulations are considered with respect to every specific site to which 
they could be applied. The result of implementing most police powers in 
this site-specific manner would be impractical and cost-prohibitive. In 
this case, such an implementation is an ineffective means of protecting 
community interests through comprehensive land-use planning. 
CONCLUSION 
The Citizens’ Alliance holding undermines the comprehensive nature 
of the GMA and a well established approach to land-use planning. The 
opinion contemplates imposing clearing and grading limit regulations 
based on site-specific evaluations, requiring the county to expend 
already tight resources and to implement an inefficient method for 
protecting community interests in environmental protection and 
preservation. Landowners in Washington State have access to numerous 
protections against overreaching government regulations that impede 
private property rights to an unreasonable degree: Constitutional, 
statutory, and administrative remedies exist for abuses of police powers. 
However, Washington’s preemption statute, RCW 82.02.020, is an 
inappropriate framework for analyzing a facial challenge of King 
County’s clearing and grading regulations, and the court of appeals erred 
when it held otherwise. Despite the court’s decision, GMA objectives 
and requirements remain. Municipalities are still obligated to have 
regulations based on the best available science that protect the functions 
and values of critical areas. The actual impact of Citizens’ Alliance 
remains to be seen, but absent a judicial correction or legislative 
clarification, treating comprehensive land-use regulations as a “tax, fee, 
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or charge” subject to the state preemption statute, without application to 
a proposed development, threatens to render comprehensive land-use 
planning nearly impossible to achieve. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
